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Abstract
Aims: Dental services differ from other health services in several dimensions. One important difference is that a
substantial share of costs of dental services–especially costs beyond routine dental treatment–is paid directly by the
patient out-of-pocket.
Settings and design: This study analyses the socio-economic determinants of out-of-pocket expenditure for dental
services (OOPE) in Austria at the household level.
Methods and material: Cross-sectional information on OOPE and household characteristics provided by the
Austrian household budget survey 2009/10 was analysed.
Statistical analysis used: A two-part model (Logit/GLM) and one-part GLM was applied.
Results: The probability of OOPE is strongly affected by the life cycle (structure) of the household. It is higher for higher
age classes, higher income, and partially higher levels of education. The type of public insurance has an influence on
expenditure probability while the existence of private health insurance has no significant effect. In contrast to the highly
statistically significant coefficients in the first stage, the covariates of the second stage remain predominantly insignificant.
According to the results, the level of expenditure is driven mainly by the level of education and income. The results of the
one-part GLM confirm the results of the two-part model.
Conclusions: The results allow new insights into the determinants of OOPE for dental care. The household level turns out
to be an adequate basis to study the determinants of OOPE, although caution should be applied before jumping to
conclusions for the individual level.
Keywords: Out-of-pocket expenditure, Dental services, Two-part model, Generalized linear model
Background
Dental care services differ to some extent from other med-
ical services, which might influence the mechanisms of ser-
vice provision and financing. Dental diseases are normally
not life threatening and the need for dental services is to
some extent predictable and/or preventable. Patients’ ability
to learn from experience about provider quality is at least
partially possible. However, expenditure smoothing by pub-
lic and/or private insurance arrangements offer lower op-
portunities for welfare improvement and higher rates of
copayment seem to be optimal. In fact, empirically, out-of-
pocket expenditure for dental services (OOPE) is higher
compared to other medical services. According to an un-
weighted OECD average in 2011, OOPE accounted for
53 % of total dental service expenditure, which is roughly
three times the level of overall OOPE of healthcare services
[1]. In Austria, the situation is similar. OOPE accounts for
50 % of dental service expenditure, leaving 2 % for the gen-
eral government, 46 % for social health insurance, and 2 %
for private health insurance financing in 2011 [2]. This high
level of OOPE raises several equity- and efficiency-related
questions. From an equity point of view one could ask to
which extent OOPE lead to changes in the income distribu-
tion on the household level. From an efficiency perspective
it is interesting whether OOPE are an adequate tool to re-
duce moral hazard. However, before drawing any policy
conclusions on this equity-efficiency trade off, it seems to
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be useful to identify the determinants influencing the level
of OOPE for dental services. Such an analysis allows deeper
insights into the different distributional effects of OOPE be-
yond the well analysed income dimension (f. e. age struc-
ture, household structure, education level, insurance level).
This paper focuses on this question at the private house-
hold level and analyses cross-sectional information of
OOPE and several household characteristics in the latest
Austrian household budget survey.
The study benefits from several strands of previous re-
search. It builds on research work on out-of-pocket health-
care expenditure based on micro data in general [3–9], and
on the bounded literature on the demand for dental ser-
vices, in particular on OOPE [10–16]. Finally, the study
benefits from research work which focuses on the link be-
tween the institutional background of healthcare service
consumption and preferred empirical strategies [17–24].
Previous research on the determinants of dental care
utilization focuses on different issues. Within the frame-
work of a Becker-type consumer’s choice model Holtman/
Olsen [12] study the demand for dental care. They specific-
ally analyse waiting time and travel time as well as the
money price as covariates of demand for dental services.
Generally, the results confirm the theoretical expectations
of the role of the mentioned covariates, but the elasticities
are low. Manning/Phelps [13] find a strong effect of insur-
ance coverage on demand for dental care. Groenewegen/
Postma [11] stress the role of regional differences in the
supply of dental capacities for the utilization of dental ser-
vices. Their results do not unequivocally support the pre-
diction that the capacity density increases utilization.
Nguyen/Häkkinnen [14] investigate the determinants of the
utilization of dentists’ services among the Finnish popula-
tion entitled to subsidized dental care on the basis of age.
In particular they focus on the impact of a two-channel fi-
nanced health care system. They find that the choice be-
tween the private and public sector is influenced by the
knowledge of the level of dental services provided by each
sector. Our study contributes to the empirical research on
OOPE for dental services. It adds evidence from the house-
hold perspective, completes and adjusts findings available
at the individual level, and studies OOPE in a highly partic-
ularized healthcare system, which is based on Bismarckian
principles and a specific two-tiered institutional architec-
ture. Reliable information on OOPE on a micro basis (indi-
vidual or household level) is rare in many countries. We
use a data basis which in principle offers a high data quality.
So as a side effect our paper also evaluates the validity of
this data source to study the determinants of health expen-
ditures in general and expenditure for dental services in
particular.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section briefly describes the institutional setting of
consuming dental services in Austria. Subsequently, a brief
description of the data, elaboration of the econometric
framework, presentation and discussion of the empirical
findings, and summary are provided.
Institutional setting of dental care in Austria
With minor modifications, the general institutional design
of demand and supply of outpatient healthcare services in
Austria is also relevant for dental services. The social health
insurance system represents the first tier of coverage
against the risks of illness. Membership in this system is ob-
ligatory for wage earners in both the public and private sec-
tors, for self-employed people, and farmers. Individuals
with family ties to people with mandatory insurance and
without their own coverage obtain free health coverage.
Overall, the social health insurance system covers around
99.3 % of the population, excluding only marginal groups.
Social health insurance is financed mainly by income-
related contributions. Private health insurance and out-of-
pocket payments constitute the second tier of the Austrian
healthcare system.
Dental services in Austria are offered by (i) private den-
tists, (ii) public dentists, (iii) dental services offered by the
social health insurance system directly (so-called dental la-
boratories), and (iv) dental ambulances of public and pri-
vate hospitals. As a workable definition, public dentists are
those that have a contract with the social health insurance
system. Private and public dentists are self-employed and
mainly work in single practices. Patients with social health
insurance coverage are free to consult providers of categor-
ies (i), (ii), (iii), and, with minor restrictions, also (iv). How-
ever, the associated costs of utilization are considerably
different.
The consumption of public dental services is based on a
benefit-in-kind scheme. Basic dental services (e.g. fillings
and teeth extraction) are offered with negligible cost-
sharing elements. This is especially true for workers in the
private sector (76 % of the population, who are covered by
the insurance label GKK). Public workers (8.6 % of the
population, who are covered by the insurance label BVA)
and employers (8.4 % of the population, who are covered
by the insurance label SVA) face a proportional cost-
sharing scheme of 20 % for these services, while farmers
(4 % of the population, who are covered by the insurance
label SVB) have to pay a quarterly lump-sum fee when
using dental services, Patients are confronted with substan-
tial amounts of cost sharing (approximately 50 % of the
costs) when they undergo specialized treatments, such as
endodontic services, crowns and bridges, and prosthodon-
tic and orthodontic services. A closer inspection of the ar-
rangements reveals quite a heterogeneous mix of
copayment methods for these dental services (proportional
and absolute cost sharing, as well as public subsidies). Cost-
sharing designs differ between the different public medical
insurance funds, in all of which fixed prosthodontics are
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cofinanced only by the social health insurance system in ex-
ceptional cases.
Similar regulation of service prices and copayments exists
for dental services offered by the public health insurance
system directly. Dental costs for private dental services are
paid out of pocket, and/or by the social health insurance
system. The latter reimburses only a portion of a private
dentist’s invoice. For basic services, the maximum
refundable amount is fixed at 80 % of the amount a public
dentist is allowed to charge for the same service. For spe-
cialized private treatments, the remuneration schedules of
contracted dentists are applied. Since the prices of private
dentists for basic and specialized treatments are higher than
those for contracted dentists, the financial burden for the
utilization of private dentists is substantial. Private health
insurance, which in general completes social health insur-
ance coverage in Austria, plays only a very limited role in
the coverage of dental expenditure risks. In 2011, 2 % of the
total costs for dental services were paid by the private
health insurance system [2].
Methods
To analyse the determinants of OOPE empirically, data
from the latest household budget survey 2009/10 con-
ducted by Statistics Austria was used. This periodically re-
peated survey (at the moment, with a 5-year interval) is
used to study the level and structure of private consump-
tion of households within the system of national accounts.
The observation unit is the private household without insti-
tutionalized households. There is no overlapping in the
sample of households, which take part in the different
waves of the survey. The total sample offered by Statistics
Austria consists of 6534 households with 15,540 members.
Owing to unclear household and/or social health insurance
status, 747 households were excluded, which results in a
final sample size of 5787 households. Information on the
consumer behaviour is gathered in two ways: (i) the diary
approach and (ii) the recall approach. Households partici-
pating in the survey are asked to fill in a diary over 14 days
in which they record every single expense. These expendi-
tures are converted into monthly expenditure presented in
euros. The dataset results in 52 overlapping weeks of book-
keeping. The recall approach is used for consumer durables
and irregular/seasonal expenditures within the last
12 months. In addition, in general, households are asked
for expenses greater than 300 € in the last year using the re-
call method. As far as out-of-pocket expenditures are con-
cerned only information on therapeutic aids in
ophthalmology and dentistry is collected by the recall
method. Selected socio-economic characteristics of each
household are gathered by face-to-face interviews. The
household budget survey includes two forms of expendi-
tures for dental care. The first form includes expenditures
for dental services in the private and the public sector.
These expenditures are mainly for “routine dental services”.
The second form of expenditures are expenditures for “spe-
cialized treatments”. Specialized treatment mainly includes
different forms of dental prostheses (crowns, bridges). In
our basic specification we analyse total dental expenditures
including routine dental services and specialized treat-
ments. For robustness checks we also estimate the coeffi-
cients of the covariates of the two expenditure forms
separately. As far as the mode of data gathering is con-
cerned we assume that the information on the expenditures
for routine dental services is mainly gathered by the diary
approach while information on the expenditures for spe-
cialized treatments is collected by the recall method.
For econometric and economic reasons, hurdle models,
specifically, two-part models, serve as methodological cor-
nerstones to explain healthcare utilization/expenditure
[21]. The first part is a binary model that focuses on the
separation between users and nonusers. The second part
explains the level/frequency of medical-care use condi-
tional on some use. Statistically, the split in the estimation
procedure is motivated by the specific characteristics of
healthcare expenditure: (i) skewness, (ii) excess zeros, and
(iii) heavy right tails. From an economic perspective, the
split in the estimation procedure is motivated by the fact
that the two decision stages are characterized by differ-
ences in the involved actors and decision covariates. The
empirical strategy in the first step normally is based on ex-
plicit or reduced versions of the Grossman model of de-
mand for health services [25, 26]. The patient seeking care
decides autonomously whether to seek professional diag-
nostic and curative medical help at all. The modelling of
the second step is influenced by principle–agent consider-
ations leading to joint decisions of patients and their ser-
vice suppliers. In summary, the ideal starting point of two-
part models is that the entire episode of medical services
is defined as a set of medical services received by a patient
in response to particular requests caused by a specific ill-
ness (for an extended discussion, see Stoddart and Barer)
[24]. The data should portray individual behaviour and
should allow separation between the initial spell and add-
itional visits.
The description of the data collection for OOPE in
Austria makes clear that the dataset does not perfectly ful-
fil these preconditions for using a two-part model. There-
fore, different econometric approaches were used. First, a
two-part model was applied. The first stage of the model
predicts the likelihood of any OOPE and was specified as
logit leading to the formula:
Prob y1 > 0ð Þ ¼
exp xαð Þ
1þ exp xαð Þ
The second part predicts the level of spending, condi-
tional on having non-zero OOPE. For the latter part, a
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generalized linear model (GLM) was used. As an alterna-
tive modelling strategy, a one-part GLM and joint esti-
mation of both decision stages was applied [8]. The
GLM accommodates skewness and related problems via
variance-weighting. In both GLM specifications, the link
function and relationship between the mean and vari-
ance was determined as suggested by, for example, Man-
ning and Mullahy [27] and Matsaganis et al. [8].
Thereby the mean function is given by:
E yjxð Þ ¼ μ xβð Þ
If the link function is the log, as it is normally the case
in health expenditure applications, then μ is the expo-
nential function. The variance function is normally pre-
sented as:
v xð Þ ¼ κ μ xβð Þð Þλ
When λ = 0, the variance is constant, when λ = 1, the vari-
ance is proportional to the mean, and when λ = 2 the vari-
ance is proportional to the mean squared [8]. In a modified
Park test, the squared residuals of a provisional log-
transformed ordinary least squares (OLS) model or a
provisional GLM model are regressed on the predictions
from the same model. The estimated coefficient λ indicates
which variance function is appropriate, suggesting either a
constant variance model (λ = 0), a proportional to the mean
model (λ = 1) or a standard deviation proportional to the
mean model (λ = 2). The last two models are sometimes
also called ‘Poisson-like’ models or ‘Gamma-like’ models,
respectively [17]. As suggested, the goodness of fit of com-
peting model specifications was evaluated by comparing the
mean absolute error, mean squared error, and R2 scores [8].
Tests concerning model fit encompass Pregibon’s link test,
Ramsey’s regression equation specification error test, a
modified Hosmer–Lemeshow test, Cook’s distance, and a
goodness of fit test for the combined model.
The dependent variable was defined as monthly OOPE
per household and several socio-economic characteristics
of the household were used as covariates: household struc-
ture or household life cycle, adults’ age structure, adults’
education level, public and private insurance characteristics,
sex of the householder, income level, and degree of
urbanization. In Table 4 (Appendix), detailed information
on the specification of these variables and the percentages
of observations with a specific characteristic are given.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the dependent
variable for the explanatory variables and distinguishes be-
tween the expenditure means and standard deviation (SD)
for the total sample and those households with expenditure
higher than zero (1384 households). The average OOPE for
the total household size is 35.57 euros (SD = 133.28). The
mean for households with non-0 OOPE is 148.74 (SD =
Table 1 Descriptive statistics according to households’
characteristics and structures
Total households Dental Care Expenditures
Average exp. Expenditures >0
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. N
Household structure
Single person I 23.75 116.86 141.57 255.19 126
Single person II 24.15 101.76 136.49 208.26 172
Unmarried couple 48.19 236.65 181.64 433.94 91
Married couple 36.12 121.22 165.35 214.82 128
Empty nest 42.77 135.90 149.14 220.51 232
Full nest I 29.74 124.98 129.84 235.45 164
Full nest II 58.80 151.77 167.71 218.01 271
Married couple w/o childs 38.16 116.47 129.61 185.51 106
Single parents 24.52 104.07 122.86 206.25 92
Degree of urbanization
High urbanization 41.21 158.53 169.37 285.82 502
Average urbanization 36.60 138.14 148.69 246.92 369
Low urbanization 29.65 99.95 128.59 175.06 513
Age structure
Age <25 7.07 35.41 86.46 94.51 17
Age 25–45 31.13 131.35 134.12 246.17 506
Age 45–65 43.96 144.97 170.07 244.81 588
Age 65–85 32.49 122.11 133.78 219.01 273
Education level
Primary education 13.15 47.19 74.56 89.96 130
Other education 38.40 140.15 154.93 247.46 1125
Tertiary education 42.79 150.56 169.61 262.05 129
Insurance characteristics (public)
GKK 30.09 126.79 137.51 242.35 892
BVA 49.75 153.49 174.31 246.88 302
SVA 47.03 127.38 161.43 193.33 141
SVB 46.11 156.38 159.03 259.34 49
Private health insurance (1) 45.56 122.36 179.77 250.98 290
Private health insurance (2) 43.59 145.52 147.91 183.19 207
Total households 35.57 133.28 148.74 239.72 1384
N (households) 5787 1384
Robustness checks
Specialized treatments 27.41 93.07 122.89 164.66 1261
Routine dental services 8.15 91.62 300.70 472.05 157
Notes: (1) corresponds to one adult of a household that has additional private
health insurance. (2) corresponds to both adults of the household having
additional private health insurance. This also includes households consisting of
one individual (single person I and single person II). Dummy variables for
female householders and income are not reported
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239.72). The data show substantial differences in the OOPE
level between households with different characteristics.
As a robustness check, OOPE is separated into two com-
ponents, (i) routine dental services and (ii) specialized treat-
ments (e.g. endodontic services, crowns, and bridges).
Overall, 1291 households with positive OOPE are in this
expenditure category (the mean OOPE for the total sample
is 27.41; the mean OOPE for the sample whose OOPE is
more than 0 is 122.88) while only 157 households have
positive OOPE for routine dental services (the mean OOPE
for the total sample is 8.15; the mean OOPE for the sample
whose OOPE is more than 0 is 300.70), see Table 1.
Results
The econometric results of the two-part-model and the
one-part GLM are summarized in Table 2. The probability
of having OOPE is influenced strongly by the life cycle of
households. In particular, larger observation units, like full
nest I (for the specification of the household structure see
Appendix Table 4 ), married couples without children, and
full nest II, have higher probabilities of spending OOPE.
Furthermore, these three household types represent the lar-
gest observation units with on average 3.3–4 household
members. As only one household member with non-zero
OOPE is sufficient to classify the total observation unit as a
household that consumes OOPE, the higher probability of
the mentioned household types might be explained, at least
partially. In addition, there is strong evidence of the rela-
tionship between adults’ age and the probability of consum-
ing OOPE. Old age is an important driver of healthcare
needs in general, and this is also true for dental healthcare.
In the case of the used dataset, the age class of 65–85 years
shows the highest probability of OOPE. The type of public
insurance influences the probability of OOPE (the reference
group is GKK). Households insured by BVA, SVB, and SVA
show a higher probability of OOPE, but the results for SVA
members remain insignificant. This might reflect the higher
proportion of cost sharing in these medical insurance
funds. The existence of private health insurance is without
any statistically significant effect. Households with a higher
level of education and income show a significantly higher
probability of having OOPE.
In the second stage, the tested kurtosis verifies a log-link
function and the estimated λ clearly suggests a SD propor-
tional to the mean model. The estimated λ of the
provisional OLS model with a log-transformed dependent
variable has a score of 2.04 and a score of 2.004 in the
provisional GLM model. In contrast to the highly statisti-
cally significant coefficients in the first stage, the covariates
of the second stage remain predominantly insignificant. Ac-
cording to the results, the level of expenditure is driven
mainly by the levels of education and income. One explan-
ation is the well-known attitude of both these groups to
contact private dentists with higher service fees. Columns 5
and 6 show the results of the one-stage GLM. The tested
kurtosis takes the score 3.3, and therefore, justifies a log-
link function. The applied Park test shows an estimated λ
of 1.84 for the provisional OLS model with a log-
transformed dependent variable and an estimated λ of 1.60
for the provisional GLM model. In the evaluation process,
the SD proportional to the mean model clearly outperforms
the proportional to the mean model, which is used in the
subsequent analysis. The considered household types, in-
come, adults’ age, and education level show strong impacts
on expenditure level. A negative effect of a lower degree of
urbanization is revealed, which might reflect limited access
to dental-care facilities. In summary, the findings of the
one-stage GLM widely confirm the results the two-part-
model.
The econometric results for households consuming spe-
cialized treatments are presented in Table 3. The results of
the two-part model and the one-part GLM are very simi-
lar to the results for total OOPE. The results for routine
dental services are widely insignificant and therefore not
presented in detail.
Discussion
Comparing the results with the findings of previous re-
search [10–16] is only partially useful. This study analyses
OOPE. The vast majority of previous studies analyse
utilization, measured by visits or total dental expenditure.
In addition, the focus of this study is on the household
while previous research is based on individual data. Finally,
the focus of this study is on socio-economic household
characteristics as explanatory variables, and controlling for
dental health status and supply-related characteristics in de-
tail is impossible. However, the ‘degree of urbanization’ was
used as a proxy for access to dental service. Therefore, this
study abstains from drawing any conclusions related to
supply side from the results (see Nguyen and Häkkinen
[14]). Previous evidence sometimes points to a U-shaped
relationship between age and dental utilization/expenditure.
The shown effect of age on OOPE is higher in older age
classes, which does not contradict a U-shaped relationship.
The reference group consists of adults who are on average
below 25 years of age. Children are included only in the
household structure. Compared to Choi [10], the study pre-
sents new and dissenting findings on the role of public and
private insurance characteristics on OOPE. The type of
public insurance influences OOPE. Copayment mecha-
nisms for routine dental services and, in particular, for spe-
cial treatment differ between the public medical insurance
funds. This is an essential feature of the Austrian healthcare
system in general, although movements to harmonize the
remuneration system of public dentists and the copayment
schemes for specialized treatment are progressing. Of
course, differences in the OOPE levels of members of the
different public medical insurance funds might also be
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caused by unobserved heterogeneity between the members
of the different insurance groups. Additional private health
insurance is without any effect on OOPE. This could be
interpreted as an indication that there is a sufficient public
level of coverage against dental expenditure risks.
We are cautious in drawing straight conclusions for den-
tal health policy from our empirical findings. In fact we will
briefly discuss the question whether data from household
budget surveys are an adequate data basis to study the de-
terminants of health care expenditures in general and ex-
penditures for dental care in particular. Reliable data on
OOPE are rare, their acquisition is very costly. Health re-
lated data sources (ATHIS, SHARE) normally use contacts
with the health care system as an indicator for utilization.
So the periodically repeated household budget surveys are
an alternative information source. Overall the design of
household budget surveys offers a high data quality. This is
ensured via the level of instructions for the participants and
the combination of the diary system and the recall ap-
proach. Potential underreporting of the levels of OOPE is
reduced by the use of a disaggregated approach that asks
for several OOPE categories. On the other hand household
Table 2 Econometric results of the two-part model and one-part GLM
Dental care expenditure
Probability (Logit) Conditional (GLM) a GLM a
Coeff. Rob. SD Coeff. Rob. SD Coeff. Rob. SD
Household structure
Single person II −0.287* 0.169 −0.005 0.048 −0.154 0.226
Unmarried couple 0.478** 0.194 −0.005 0.052 0.775*** 0.266
Married couple 0.125 0.178 −0.068 0.053 −0.137 0.255
Empty nest 0.267 0.186 −0.005 0.049 0.107 0.259
Full nest I 0.390** 0.165 −0.075* 0.043 0.162 0.237
Full nest II 0.690*** 0.162 0.008 0.040 0.496** 0.231
Married couple w/o children 0.464** 0.205 −0.081 0.057 −0.040 0.297
Single parents 0.011 0.189 −0.033 0.050 0.012 0.246
Degree of urbanization
Average urbanization −0.041 0.095 −0.022 0.024 −0.019 0.136
Low urbanization −0.135 0.089 −0.022 0.023 −0.287** 0.126
Age structure
Age 25–45 years 0.997*** 0.315 0.062 0.116 1.343*** 0.306
Age 45–65 years 1.301*** 0.322 0.105 0.117 1.873*** 0.321
Age 65–85 years 1.420*** 0.341 0.035 0.121 1.861*** 0.345
Education level
Other education 0.272** 0.132 0.089** 0.042 0.694*** 0.174
Tertiary education 0.282 0.185 0.090* 0.051 0.832*** 0.253
Insurance characteristics (public)
BVA 0.288*** 0.095 0.028 0.025 0.323** 0.139
SVA 0.170 0.129 0.024 0.029 0.304 0.192
SVB 0.531*** 0.205 0.066 0.045 0.668** 0.311
Private health insurance (1) 0.179 0.113 0.013 0.026 0.150 0.170
Private health insurance (2) 0.016 0.096 0.007 0.023 0.121 0.134
Other characteristics
Female householder 0.214** 0.095 0.028 0.025 0.121 0.137
Income (log) 0.235** 0.095 0.129*** 0.026 0.466*** 0.124
Constant −4.795*** 0.759 0.268 0.218 −2.684*** 0.955
Observations (households) 5787 1384 5787
Notes: aGLM with log-link and gamma distribution. (1) corresponds to one adult of the household with additional private health insurance. (2) corresponds to both
adults of the household having additional private health insurance. This also includes households consisting of one individual (single person I and single person II).
Reference groups: single person I, high urbanization, age class 18–25 years, primary education, GKK, no additional private health insurance, and male householder.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1
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budget surveys also have clear limitations. They only
include rudimental information on socio-economic charac-
teristics of the household and its members which are im-
portant for explaining the utilization of dental services. The
same is true for covariates which picture the supply side of
dental services (f. e. density of private and public dentists).
Additionally, the two modes of data gathering have conse-
quences for the reliability of the empirical methods. In
principle, the combination of the diary system for routine
expenditures and the recall system for specialized treatment
seems to be an adequate strategy of data collection. But we
should be aware of the fact that the length of the observa-
tion period (2 weeks in the diary system, 1 year in the recall
system) has direct consequences for the empirical results in
the two steps of the two part model. Finally the information
from the household budget survey is period based and does
not allow a separation in different steps of the utilization
process. Such a separation is necessary to substantiate the
two steps of the two part model from an economic point of
view.
Conclusions
This paper analyses the socio-economic determinants of
OOPE of private households in Austria using data from the
household budget survey 2009/10. The main conclusions
are as follows. The characteristics of the data (household-
level data, period-based data, and short observation period)
pose several challenges for the choice of empirical estima-
tion procedure. So we decided to compare different
econometric procedures (two part model, GLM). Oure esti-
mation reveals highly significant results for several house-
hold characteristics (household life cycle, adults’ age, adults’
education, and income) in explaining the probability of
OOPE (first stage). However, in the second stage (expend-
iture level), only income and education have significant co-
efficients. The one-part GLM estimation confirms the
results of the two-part model. The existence of private
health insurance has no influence on the expenditure prob-
ability/level while the type of public insurance influences
the expenditure probability. The household structure seems
to have a strong effect on the expenditures for specialized
treatments. The majority of the covariates used to explain
expenditures for routine dental services are widely insignifi-
cant. The household turns out to be a promising basis to
study the determinants of dental expenditure and
Table 3 Econometric results of the two-part model and
one-part GLM (specialized treatments)
















−0.115 0.145 0.121 0.183 −0.010 0.208
Unmarried
couple
0.475*** 0.174 −0.104 0.174 0.307 0.252
Married couple 0.089 0.158 −0.109 0.180 −0.106 0.243
Empty nest 0.360** 0.159 −0.047 0.175 0.212 0.242
Full nest I 0.353** 0.152 −0.146 0.156 0.084 0.226
Full nest II 0.754*** 0.145 0.029 0.142 0.588*** 0.218
Married couple
w/o childs
0.365** 0.180 −0.421** 0.185 −0.154 0.277





−0.047 0.084 −0.110 0.088 −0.060 0.127
Low
urbanization
−0.171** 0.079 −0.147* 0.081 −0.251** 0.117
Age structure
Age 25–45 1.133*** 0.285 0.272 0.342 1.279*** 0.292
Age 45–65 1.333*** 0.292 0.598* 0.348 1.804*** 0.301




0.291** 0.116 0.489*** 0.137 0.642*** 0.165
Tertiary
education




BVA 0.171** 0.085 −0.004 0.080 0.186 0.130
SVA 0.204* 0.113 0.147 0.112 0.338* 0.179
SVB 0.425** 0.182 0.164 0.158 0.436 0.290
Private health
insurance (1)
0.220** 0.099 0.024 0.092 0.214 0.159
Private health
insurance (2)





0.093 0.084 0.137 0.099 0.190 0.127
Table 3 Econometric results of the two-part model and
one-part GLM (specialized treatments) (Continued)
Income (log) 0.202** 0.085 0.475*** 0.077 0.610*** 0.114




Notes: aGLM with log-link and gamma distribution. Significance level *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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supplements the previous research, which focuses on the
individual level.
Appendix






Single person 1 12.98 0.44 Household consists of
1 adult, single.





5.93 0.31 Household consists of 2
adults, unmarried.








Full nest 1 12.37 0.43 Household consists of 2
adults, members are
below 40 years, at least
one child.
Full nest II 13.36 0.45 Household consists of
2 adults, members are




6.22 0.32 Household consists of
more than 3 adults,
married, no children.
Single parents 7.97 0.36 Household consists of





35.65 0.63 Areas with a population






25.90 0.58 Areas with a population
of at least 50,000 and
100–500 inhabitants per
square kilometer.
Low urbanization 38.45 0.54 All other areas.
Age structure





Table 4 Overview of variable specification and corresponding
share of observations (Continued)























Other education 78.43 0.54 Both adults have a mixed
or secondary education





8.83 0.37 Both adults have a
secondary education








BVA 18.28 0.51 Public servants. Refers to
householder’s insurance
type.
SVA 8.36 0.36 Employers. Refers to
householders insurance
type.



















32.73 0.62 Householder is female.
Income 2986.40 2025.56 Monthly household
Income in Euros.
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